In Ireland we are often publicly coy about saying what we mean, in particular as a person departs or dies the tendency is to wax lyrical when during their time or tenure the opinion a person held wasn’t in line with the following statements.
In our firm we tell it like it is, we say exactly what we mean, no matter what, that is why when you look at the critiques in this article by Colm Kelpie about the departure of Central Bank Governor Patrick Honohan you see that we stick to our guns.
There is nothing fluffy in this…
Karl Deeter, Irish Mortgage Brokers: “Whatever people say about his performance as a governor, on the consumer protection side he oversaw some of the worst regulation in the modern western world, particularly the ban on repossessions, the unworkable code of conduct on mortgage arrears, and the fact that Ireland has a persistent arrears problem unlike any other developed country in the world.
They show an unwillingness to deal with some of the hard issues surrounding the issue of arrears. Basically everything was a delay tactic.”
The only other person to come close to sincerity is Dermot O’Leary of Goodbody Stockbrokers who said that
“One criticism would be the in ability of the Central Bank to foresee the scale of the capital requirements in the banking system, which had to be dealt with on a number of occasions, culminating in the stress test exercise of early 2011.”
We believe Mr. Honohan did his best, of that there is no doubt, but results count and in that light we are hopeful that his replacement Philip Lane, will fare better.
Do you think that mortgage brokers were adequately regulated by the Central Bank in the years leading up to the crash?
I queried that myseslf back in 2009 with Governor Honohan and wrote a white paper about the issues of remuneration in particular and many other things, the report was acknowledged but ignored. In terms of how they were monitored, there weren’t many post-event examples of mortgage brokers being systemically risky or having engaged in activity (facilitating lending not being one) that endangered people or the wider financial sector.
Footnote 27 on page 21 of the Nyberg Report states that: Mortgage intermediaries began to emerge as a force in the residential mortgage market in the mid-1990’s, initially as a distribution channel for non-branch based mortgage lenders. Due in part to alliances with estate agents they exercised significant control over the “first time buyer” market in particular. This market was viewed by lenders as an attractive market segment and key for customer acquisition and exit financing for development lending.
peak of the market in 2005 mortgage intermediaries accounted for about 45% of new residential mortgage loans.
Against this background, intermediaries were able to leverage their relationships with lenders pushing for better mortgage terms (and sometimes larger loans). This led to a considerable reduction in bank margins (interest and commission). Many banks sought to compensate by increasing loan volumes to maintain earnings. While these changes impacted on the mortgage market, mortgage intermediaries had only a limited and indirect impact on the banking problems which are the subject of this Report because, in the final analysis, intermediaries did not make the lending decisions.
I hope that helps.