Irish Mortgage Brokers Blog

If you go into arrears on your mortgage or you talk to your lender because you believe you are a ‘pre-arrears’ candidate then you will be asked to fill in a ‘Standard Financial Statement‘ or SFS which is part of the Mortgage Arrears Resolution Process (MARP) which started last year.

Engaging with the lender is a key tenet of this and filling in the SFS and liaising with the lender on aspects of it. The information in this is what will be used to negotiate the repayment that you will pay in cases where lifestyle adjustment does not allow you to make the full payment.

We have made a few more bold predictions in our ‘Mortgage Market Trend Outlook 2012′ and reviewed how wrong many of our 2011 forecasts were as well.

Some of the main points thus far are:

1. That mortgage lending bottomed out in 2011.
2. That IBRC may take on some tracker loan portfolios to de-risk state owned banks (as the state already owns these loans entirely anyway).
3. That rates for existing AIB borrowers will have to go up but that for new borrowers rates may come down with changes to how prices are charged depending on risk of the proposed loan.
4. That deposit rates will start to drop.
5. That up to 25,000 mortgages will be deemed ‘unsustainable’ and that the ‘won’t pay’ contingent of arrears cases may be as high as 1 in 5.

We hope you enjoy this report, we in turn hope that we get some of the calls right!

Many thanks,

Irish Mortgage Brokers

RTE interviewed Karl Deeter in this clip about the recent CSO report, it was on the 20th of December 2011.

This is the usual update of rates available at the moment. As you’ll notice, AIB is the leader in almost every section. However, they are not necessarily lending to every client hoping to obtain finance with them - to know if they’ll be the lender of choice you need to construct the application in a manner that will ensure it shows the best aspects of the case to them.

There are lots of other lenders out there too (we deal with the pillar banks and many others as well), so looking at ‘best rate’ is perhaps different than ‘best attainable rate’.

Anyway, here is the list, if you ever want mortgage advice give us a call! 016790990

Best variable rate mortgage: AIB 3.24% (with one for 2.84% < 50% LTV)

Best 1yr fixed rate mortgage: AIB 4.15%

Best 2yr fixed rate mortgage: PTsb 3.1% < 50% LTV, otherwise AIB 4.65%

Best 3yr fixed rate mortgage: AIB 4.88%

Best 5yr fixed rate mortgage: PTsb 3.7% < 50% LTV, otherwise its AIB 5.35%

Best 10yr fixed rate mortgage: n/A 12/2011

Oh, one final thing, AIB called everybody into a meeting at their head office about two weeks ago, the resounding message was that they are going to be lending more in 2012 but prudence will remain and prices will change (upwards to more comparable market rates).

David McWilliams hit an interesting point in today’s piece in the Independent about having ‘too much regulation’, and how it may repel new banks from coming here.

in late 2009 I was picked as part of a team that approached PostBank with a view to turning it into an SME business bank - our proposal never even made it as far as board meetings because they were determined to close down rather than continue, we found the whole process perverse at best.

Instead the same investor group will be setting up in the UK, meaning SME’s in Ireland lose out on funding.

It isn’t that new banks don’t want to come here, it is that they are routinely put off from doing so via the Central Bank and the way in which we grant banking licences in this country.

The other regulatory issue is Basel III.

Asking a bank during a time like this to hold more capital makes sense from a risk perspective, but from every other angle it is a noose.

Banks are being asked to deleverage (have fewer loans versus deposits), market forces are making them pay more for deposits than is healthy, they have huge tracker mortgage books that even when they perform create a loss and at the same time we want them to lend.

Simply put, these are not compatible objectives.

Banks HAVE to become zombies in order to continue because it is only with huge liquidity & capital injections at low prices that they could hope to work normally again - and we have already spent all of the money we have on saving them; so their alternative is to grind along trying to make whatever money they can and in a very very long time they will eventually be breaking even (think Japan)

That is the true tragedy of the crisis, if we had let Anglo close (I argued for this here) and only tried to save a few good banks (even though AIB is a banger it is still the owner of half of the payments system that the likes of EBS sit on top of) then we could have had a chance - it would have also required going right down the order of liabilities as follows:

Sharholders - wiped out
Preference Shares - wiped out
Mezz & SubOrd - wiped out
Senior bonds - turned into new equity
Depositors - saved (in order to maintain confidence)

Then we could have given 25bn in low cost money to the banks to make them healthy. Naturally hindsight is 20:20, we are never so prepared for anythin we are for yesterday!

But the new point is clear - regulation in itself is actually a risk, and a systemic one. Regulatory Risk will be a common word in banking vernacular of the future.

The entire justification of regulation and the bearing of its cost on the financial system (which ultimately gets built into consumer prices) is the avoidance of the systemic risk it is meant to mitigate. It didn’t and it won’t in the future so why is more of it now the solution?

Mainly because it sounds good…

When a bank creates a loan that becomes an asset, the property it is secured upon is the collateral (sorry my teaming millions, I know I repeat this eternally). So if NAMA decide to become a brand of lender this October as we saw from an article in today’s Independent; then how does it work? Where does the money come from?

Take a property that they are putting up for sale (1st picture: pic not related). We’ll say for the sake of this example that it is worth €200,000.

The NAMA position may be that they paid more or less for this particular property but it doesn’t really matter; what does matter is that for the sake of them selling it the property may as well be unencumbered, there is no lien above that held by the NAMA.

This means they can give a title deed to the buyer when they sell it - but don’t forget, when a person takes out a mortgage there are two sales/purchases, the individual buys from the vendor (1st sale/purchase) then they sell it to the bank in exchange for the money [we call the 'mortgage] to complete the transaction (2nd sale/purchase) and the bank then take the ‘1st lien’ or ‘right’ on the property.

Prior to this they put in their deposit (10% or €20,000) which becomes their own, this is their ‘equity’, which is why ‘negative equity’ is described not as value versus the market (that’s called ‘price’), rather value versus the mortgage secured on the property.

What NAMA have indicated is that they will provide a kind of ‘bridging finance’ for buyers, so a certain portion will be made up of Bank borrowing, just a regular mortgage (we’ll speculate that it will be 60%).

This has a key advantage for the bank who will have 1st lien (because NAMA have said that there is some loss sharing mechanism which would indicate that at best they hope for 2nd lien). First of all they have a low loan to value (LTV) mortgage - considered lower risk because before the property gets into negative equity from the banks perspective (60% of 200k is €120,000) the price would have to fall a further €80,000. Secondly it means that they can lend a little more freely because their risk in this instance is reduced, it doesn’t mean ‘lax standards’ but it shouldn’t be as stringent as the lunacy that prevails now where it is so difficult to obtain credit.

So working through the example: The buyer puts in €20,000 (10%), the bank forward €120,000 (60%) leaving €60,000 (30%) to cover.

Thus we have the NAMA input; but where does this money come from?

Quite simply it comes from nowhere.

How? Because the property is unencumbered so what NAMA do is draw up a loan agreement (that then becomes an asset) and they give you the keys, along with an agreement that (speculating) might say that if prices fall then after 5 years there is some kind of loss sharing mechanism.

This means that they go from a situation of having an empty apartment generating nothing into the following:

Buyers input: €20,000
Mortgage: €120,000
Loan written: €60,000

The first two give a cash input of €140,000 which can then be invested (we’ll assume they get 5% p.a.) and they also have a loan of €60,000 which is a future claim on earnings of the buyer (again, we’ll assume 5% interest rate).

If there is ‘loss sharing’ don’t forget, the buyers equity gets wiped out first so it is not a case that if values fall that NAMA are onto a loser, rather it is if they fall greater than 10% over the next 5 years, and that may well be likely but don’t forget, they have money in hand today which will generate profit elsewhere.

That 140k over 5yrs at 5% will give them €178,679 (compound interest being [M=P(1+i)n]), the 60k loan will bring in €16,567 in cash meaning that they have €60,000 at risk but €55,246 in cash-flow, and let us not forget that if prices did fall and fall that the €120,000 bank loan has no loss sharing and would put NAMA in a better position than if they held out and sold at a later date - but I see that as an Armageddon scenario.

If prices fell a further 20% (which could happen and was hinted at in the Central Bank paper ‘Scenarios for Irish House Prices‘) then NAMA only have €20,000 to worry about and depending on the loss sharing scheme put forward all they do is write down the value of their loan on that basis giving the following:

€120,000 underlying bank loan
€20,000 deposit (now wiped out as buyers equity goes first)
€200,000 - 20% = €160,000 so the €60k loan they advanced becomes a €40k loan from that day forward.

Not a bad deal (for them) all said.

Our prediction that fixed rates would cease to exist this year is proving quite accurate, at the time we took quite a beating for making such a ‘drastic’ call in our Mortgage Market Trend Outlook report.

So far, PTsb have removed them and now Haven (and likely EBS) are set to do the same. We received notice today (see below)

The concern from a borrowers perspective is that we are getting to a point where you can’t fix a mortgage and you will be forced to ride the rate hikes that banks come up with including any that come from the ECB.

HAVEN FIXED RATE UPDATE

Due to ongoing increases in the cost of funds we will be temporarily
withdrawing both new and existing business mortgage fixed rates.
Significant movements on financial markets have resulted in fixed rates
which would not deliver value to customers at this time.  This position
will, of course, remain under constant review.

PIPELINE IMPLICATIONS

New business loan offers will be honoured until close of business Monday
28th February 2011.  Any case not completed by Monday 28th will be subject
to an amended offer for acceptance of the applicable tiered variable rate.

For existing customers, all fixed rate offers will be honoured until close
of business Friday February 18th 2011.  In each case Haven must be in
receipt of a Fixed Rate Mortgage Conversion form by close of business
Friday 18th to secure the application of a fixed rate term.

Section 23 properties have had their tax treatment changed, in effect the buyer honoured their side of the contract from the outset and after the initiation of this the Government reneged on their side of it. This is contrary to the idea of fairness, the concept of contractual obligations, and it undermines the faith any taxpayer can have in the state.

The state recently cut many people with income tax and reductions in entitlements, but these were never contractual and people certainly didn’t leverage up to obtain them. Landlords may not be a group worthy of sympathy, but at the same time recent changes to taxation on rent (Case V income) mean the amount of financing expense the business can offset has dropped by 25% (mortgage interest you can offset has gone from 100% to 75%), this is contrary to the rules of accounting when you look at any other business.

The only solution is a reversal of this policy, and perhaps the only way to ensure this is to apply the idea of mutual assured destruction. If there were 10,000 section 23 owners who all signed up to a commitment to go into 100% default on the 1st of April if this is not changed then you would see that the state would reverse this policy because it is flawed and because the 60-100m in savings that they would make would be eradicated by the ensuing mess the banks would be left in because of it.

When default becomes discretionary then a solution becomes necessity, and at this point, for many landlords default is becoming an option because they are being hit from all sides. Banks are looking for capital and interest payments at a time when rents are dropping, subsidizing the capital payments is often coming from earned income which is being subjected to more taxation, landlords are making imaginary profits because they can’t offset their expenses fully and now a lasing commitment regarding property taxation has been grabbed because it was easier than making the right decision.

The right thing would be to tax all property rather than just attacking those who hold investment property, they made this move before with the NPPR tax (€200 p.a.), and there was no resistance despite the fact that a flat tax of this nature was grossly unfair and didn’t distinguish between a mansion and a one bed apartment. Now there is an extension of this approach because it’s easy, because landlords don’t fight back, but that forgets the fact that you reach a certain point and people simply roll over or opt out, Atlas can always shrug.

Perhaps it was time that the Government found out that we do have an ace up our collective sleeve, and that it can be used to destroy the system they have fought so hard to save.

The EBS is on the block and there have been countless headlines regarding the idea that debts might get written down by Wilbur Ross if the Cardinal Capital group (who he is backing) are the successful bidder. I have said that I doubt this will happen and will set out why in this post.

EBS carried out a PCAR (prudential capital assessment requirement) test in March 2010, it showed that they required €875 million in funding to come up to scratch. Thus far they received €100m in cash from the state and a further €250m in a promissory note leaving a gap of €525m to fill. The bids being touted are in the region of €550m meaning that whoever buys in is effectively bridging the gap and paying a small premium as well.

Take a look at a balance sheet and you’ll see that no matter what happens, that in the end assets=liabilities. That is an accounting identity, in our example we have a hypothetical bank which has assets and liabilities worth (for example sake) €100 million Euro.

In a balance sheet of a bank the loans are the assets and things like equity, deposits and bonds are all the liabilities. Banks are unique in this respect, the deposits which they need are liabilities (obligations) of the bank, used to create loans (liabilities to other parties) which become the assets.

So if you were to ‘write down’ loans you are reducing the value of the assets, we’ll say that there is a write down of 20% on loans and that in this bank there are only bog standard €200,000 loans, 500 in total and they all started on the same day (naturally it doesn’t really work this way but this is just to make the point).

So now you have assets worth less than the liabilities, and assets always equals liabilities, so your choice is to either create unfunded loans out of thin air (impossible), or get free assets via the state (the Irish version of capitalism) or reduce liabilities in line with the reduced asset value. How does that happen?

There is a hierarchy, an order in which the liabilities are eradicated and it is shown in broad terms below.

What happens is that the blue bit at the top (equity) is eradicated first, then it goes down the line of creditors. The people bidding for EBS are NOT stating that they are going to burn bondholders or any other bank creditor and therein lies the ruse, because it means they can’t write down debt without using what is effectively an accounting trick (I’ll cover equity stakes in property in a later blog).

As you can see, if you write down the assets, the first in line to take the hit will be the equity holders, and the parties bidding for EBS are bidding for 70% equity in the building society. So a write-down [in the traditional sense] would merely wipe out the equity stake that they have just paid so dearly to take.

The only way this could occur otherwise is if the write downs were on such a small level that they didn’t affect the balance sheet (in which case the promise of writing down debts in insincere), or it is via accounting tricks (equity stakes), or if there is further government assistance that the rest of us don’t know about in the pipeline.

The reason that they are able to do this in the USA is that mortgages sold are in packages where they are valued at 20c on the Dollar, so when you buy them you can afford to let the borrowers know that they now owe only 50c on the Dollar and you give them a new interest rate or other terms and conditions, in our hypothetical bank that would mean that mortgages were now all €100,000 instead of €200,000. The EBS isn’t being sold on that basis, so this can’t happen, and thus it is the reason for my rather sceptical views on ‘mortgage debt relief’ any time soon.

Along with many others, I was confused at the fascination with EBS as a takeover target. You see, EBS’s best year recorded a profit of less than €50 million. Which given the size of its operation and loan book is rather unimpressive. The company is also heavily staffed by union members meaning it would be difficult for present management to wade in and cut the numbers in a meaningful manner.

So what is the obsession with private equity and EBS? And what about PTsb?

For a start, PTsb are not currently my lead favourite as a bidder, there are two reasons, one is that the bank rescue plans are being looked at from a competition aspect in Europe, and if PTsb were to take over EBS it would reduce competitive forces, secondly, PTsb may not be in condition to do a takeover. They have their stress-test due out in September and for now we have no idea of how that will look, EBS would add a large chunk to their loan book but deposits in the society are only c. €1bn and that may not aid in creating the loan/deposit balance that banks are looking for, especially given that PTsb are still firmly over the 200% mark. Lastly is a political consideration, every person working in EBS has a significant other in PTsb, if they were to take over it would make great sense from a costing perspective because you could literally fire almost everybody. However, the government are not likely to be in favour of that given the fall out that would result. If private equity took over EBS might (hypothetically) go from 1,000 workers to 700, but if PTsb took over it would go down to more like 200.

Which leaves private equity in the front line, for two reasons, they will bring some of their own capital (who ever wins the bid will be doing it with implicit state support included), and they will help to maintain competition while not reducing staff numbers as heavily as the first option.

Why would private equity be interested? Most of the distribution in EBS is via an agency network which is basically like having a lot of tied brokers?

The agency network does something brokerage in other institutions fail to do, namely raising funding. EBS have made good headway in that respect, bringing in €750m in 2008, €670m in 2009 and on target to do the same in 2010, but the real attraction is a relatively robust loan book with pricing opportunity.

The big banks have a loan book that roughly looks like this

Fixed Rates 20% (much of which may revert to tracker)
SVR’s           20%
Trackers      60%

EBS on the other hand has the inverse

Fixed Rates 20% (most of which revert to SVR)
SVR’s           60%
Trackers      20%

Which quickly explains the fascination, whoever takes over EBS has the ability to increase rates across the loan book in a manner which will have magnified results, much of the mature loan book will shoulder this quite well and ultimately create a profitable organization.

The three key factors will be to reprice the loan book, to lower deposit rates, and to find operational efficiency via staff numbers. A new owner will find it relatively easy to perform all three and to go on and sell the bank in a few years, that is the reason for the level of interest in EBS, they had low profits in the past because they were a mutual, but take the membership agenda out of the equation and you have a bank that is primed for making profit.